Politics & History - Lessons

 Two pieces from Englesberg Ideas are being mashed together in this post. Selected subconsciously or not, bear with me.

One looks at Europe and Russia; the other only considers China. The more Trump denigrates NATO and allies, the more I keep wanting to ask this question: who won World War Two?

Not us. The United Nations led by America, Great Britain, the USSR, and China won World War II. 

The red teams mentioned in the first essay should be applied to the maritime problems outlined in the second; the allies favored in the second are needed for the problem of Russia.

NATO’s 1937 moment  

This sense of a ‘prewar era’ has only become more urgent as senior officials and officers across the Euro-Atlantic community point to the possibility of a Russian attack on NATO within the foreseeable future. Primarily, the new approach has focused on increased defence spending. Thinking about the challenge, though, tends towards updates of the past, framing the broader picture either as a ‘return to the Cold War’ or revisiting the Nazi assault on Europe of the late 1930s, and the specific one of a Russian assault on the Baltic States. Very often, however, these are echoes and versions of debates that the Euro-Atlantic community has had for the last 20 years: a new Cold War. And all too often, the discussion about the late 1930s returns to the well-worn analogies of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

In fact, 1937 offers another apt reference point for lessons about evolving strategic challenges and deterrence and defence: this was the year that then-Colonel Arthur Percival, a well-connected, decorated and upwardly mobile British officer, wrote an ‘appreciation’ of a potential attack on Singapore from the Japanese point of view. Following on-site inspections in Singapore and Malaya, Percival observed that such tremendous change had taken place concerning the whole problem of the defence of the naval base at Singapore that it could no longer be considered an impregnable fortress. Instead, the base would be in imminent danger if war broke out.

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‘Our 1937 moment’ means shaping an appreciation of a potential attack on NATO from the Russian point of view and acting on it. The long-serving baseline scenario of a Russian invasion of the Baltic States appears to be the most complex and potentially costly of options open to Moscow given the terrain and NATO’s defensive preparations. So, why would it work this way, and what are Moscow’s alternatives? How do Moscow’s changing international partnerships influence this, if at all? Answers to these questions will go a long way to mitigating the perennial Euro-Atlantic sense of surprise about Moscow’s actions, and to ensuring that deterrence and defence remain not just up-to-date, but ready for the future.

(Which should also seriously under the idea of a conspiracy underlying the Pearl Harbor attack - the British military made similar mistakes regarding Japan.)

Maritime allies are America’s superpower  

Realistically, building a commercial maritime-industrial base to compete with China’s would require vast sums of money. This would not be a one-time expenditure for retooling outdated shipyards and modernising crane factories. Grants and loans to manufacturers are only part of the story. Higher wages – which ultimately would be funded by larger public subsidies for commercial vessels – would be needed to attract workers into an industry they have shunned. Selling that industry’s products would entail a readiness to provide public-sector financing to shipowners – and to accept stunning losses when difficult economic conditions cause owners to default on their mortgages and leases. International collaboration to produce ships and maritime equipment at costs even remotely comparable to China’s cannot be taken for granted: shipyards tend to be large employers, and any government that will cede the jobs of well-paid workers represented by powerful labour unions is brave indeed.

Would approaching commercial shipbuilding as a collective venture diminish America’s standing as a great power? Hardly. Shipping is a thoroughly globalised industry, and no one worries about where a vessel was built. Nor would cooperation with friends and allies on maritime matters diminish the country’s ability to project force, deter adversaries and secure sea lanes. Nationalism has not served the maritime industry well, it is not likely to succeed in sustaining a defence against China’s challenge.

 sch 12/21